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Abstract—Virtualization technology allows the coexistence and
execution of multiple operating systems on top of the same hard-
ware platform. In the embedded systems domain, virtualization
has been focused on the isolation of critical requirements like
real-time, security and safety from non-critical characteristics.
The strict confinement of guest partitions typically provided by
virtualization does not suit the modular and inter-cooperative
nature of embedded systems. The need for inter-partition commu-
nication has been addressed by multiple virtualization solutions,
either to enable guest-level device para-virtualization or to ensure
increased flexibility regarding cooperative partitions. However,
the majority of existing approaches follow an ad hoc approach
with limited to none applicability outside their solution’s scope.
This paper presents TZ-VirtIO, an asynchronous standard-
ized inter-partition communication (IPC) mechanism on top
of a TrustZone-assisted dual-OS hypervisor (LTZVisor). The
implemented IPC uses the standard VirtIO transport layer. The
experiments conducted on a physical platform show a scalable,
high-bandwidth and low-overhead solution for both single-core
and multi-core architectures.
Index Terms—TrustZone, Virtualization, Communication,
Monitor, Security, VirtIO, ARM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtualization technology has been used as one of the
mainstream approaches to allow the coexistence of multiple
operating systems (OSes) on the same hardware platform [1].
In the embedded systems field, virtualization has been focused
on the isolation of critical requirements from non-critical
characteristics. Embedded industrial, automotive and medical
applications, need to guarantee the deadlines of real-time tasks
and their security, while at the same time, integrating rich
environments for monitoring and network purposes [2], [3].
Despite all the advantages of virtualization, the rigid isola-
tion of traditional virtualized environments is not particularly
suitable for meeting embedded industries requirements. The
strict partition confinement interferes with the embedded sys-
tems modular and inter-cooperative nature. Hence, embedded
systems virtualization disrupts from traditional virtualization
given its need for low-overhead, high-bandwidth and se-
cure communication channels bridging guest partitions [4].
The communication enables cooperation of the embedded
subsystems, allowing for a possible balanced workload and
cooperation between different and heterogeneous OS classes.
Several virtualization solutions such as Xen [5], SASP [6],
SafeG [7], Jailhouse [8], and BlueVisor [9] have implemented
inter-partition communication mechanisms, but all of them
follow an ad hoc implementation. VirtIO [10], a device ab-
straction composed by a set of arrays and descriptors, was
proposed as de-facto standard for virtual I/O devices, and
adopted by KVM [11] and lguest [12] for enabling device
para-virtualization. More recently, VirtIO, as a result of its
abstraction capabilities and efficient performance, was adopted
as the transport abstraction layer for several communication
mechanisms [13] [14], including Texas’ RPMsg. The pair
RPMsg/VirtIO, a multi-core communication mechanism, was
later included on popular multi-core heterogeneous frame-
works such as OpenAMP and MEMF [15].
This paper presents the implementation of a standard-
ized inter-partition/inter-core communication mechanism in a
TrustZone-assisted hypervisor (LTZVisor [3], [16]). The com-
munication mechanism uses the standard VirtIO as the trans-
port abstract layer. The implemented mechanism features an
asynchronous inter-partition communication supporting both
single- and multi-core architectures. The conducted experi-
ments demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach,
presenting promising results in both system configurations
(single- and multi-core). The proposed solution distinguishes
from related work by implementing a standardized commu-
nication interface on a TrustZone-assisted hypervisor, while
keeping the system’s real-time capabilities.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ARM TrustZone
ARM TrustZone is a security technology deployed on cur-
rent system-on-chip (SoC). The technology has been available
on ARM application processors (Cortex-A) for several years
and has recently been extended to cover the new generation
of ARM microcontrollers (Cortex-M). TrustZone for ARMv8-
M has the same high-level features as TrustZone for Cortex-A
series, but its design is optimized for microcontrollers and low-
power applications. The remainder of this section focus on the
specificities of TrustZone for the application processors.
At the heart of TrustZone approach is the concept of
secure and non-secure worlds. These two virtual environments
are completely hardware isolated, with non-secure software
blocked from directly accessing secure world resources. The
current world in which the processor runs is determined by the
Non-Secure (NS) bit, and is propagated over the memory and
peripheral buses. The transition between the secure and non-
secure worlds can be bridged via the secure monitor, which
runs at the highest privileged processor mode (monitor mode).
To enter the monitor mode, a new privileged instruction, SMC
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(Secure Monitor Call), was specified. The monitor can also
be triggered by configuring it to handle exceptions in the
secure world. Still at the processor level, to ensure a strong
isolation between secure and non-secure states, some special
registers are banked, and some security critical registers are
totally unavailable to the non-secure world. The memory
infrastructure outside the core can also be partitioned into the
two worlds through the TrustZone Address Space Controller
(TZASC). DRAM can be partitioned into distinct memory
regions, each of which can be configured to be used in either
world. Furthermore, the processor provides two virtual Mem-
ory Management Units (MMUs), and isolation is also present
at the cache-level. System peripherals can also be configured
as secure or non-secure through the TrustZone Protection
Controller (TZPC). The Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC)
provides both secure and non-secure interrupt sources, while
allowing the configuration of secure interrupts with a higher
priority than the non-secure interrupts.
B. LTZVisor
LTZVisor [3], from TZVisor Project1, is an open-source
lightweight TrustZone-assisted hypervisor mainly targeting the
consolidation of mixed-criticality systems. LTZVisor imple-
ments the classical dual-guest OS configuration: the secure
world hosts the real-time operating system (RTOS) and the hy-
pervisor, while the non-secure world is assigned to the general-
purpose operating system (GPOS) (Fig. 1). LTZVisor provides
support for a single-core configuration, and LTZVisor-AMP
[16] implements support for a supervised asymmetric multi-
processing configuration.
The hypervisor runs in the highest privileged processor
mode, i.e. the monitor mode. It is responsible for enforcing the
inter-partition isolation, through several configurations such as
memory and device partition, as well as exception handling.
The RTOS kernel runs in the supervisor mode of the secure
partition. Therefore, it has full view over the non-secure privi-
leged software, which means it is part of the trusted computing
base (TCB) and necessarily must have a small footprint.
The GPOS kernel runs in the supervisor mode of the non-
secure partition. The secure partition is completely isolated
from the non-secure partition, and any attempt from the non-
secure guest OS to access any of the secure world resources
will immediately trigger an exception to be handled by the
hypervisor. In LTZVisor-AMP, each partition has an assigned
dedicated core following a one-to-one mapping between guest
OSes, cores and processor states. The hypervisor runs in the
secure world. Its main features run on the secure core, whereas
a service layer in the non-secure core provides inter-partition
communication support and exception handling for the GPOS.
Spatial isolation between guest OSes is enforced by the
TrustZone-aware hardware. The hypervisor uses the TZASC
to configure the security state of the memory blocks of the
respective partition. LTZVisor follows the suggested ARM


























GPOS Tasks RTOS Tasks
Non-Secure Partit ion (GPOS)
Fig. 1: LTZVisor generic architecture
partition and interrupt requests (IRQs) to the non-secure
partition. In the single-core architecture, while executing in the
non-secure world, FIQs are set to be handled by the hypervisor.
The hypervisor will then trigger a context-switch to the secure
partition, resulting in minimal interrupt latencies for the real-
time OS.
C. VirtIO
VirtIO [10] emerged as an attempt to become the de-facto
standard for virtual I/O devices in para-virtualized hypervi-
sors. VirtIO is an abstract layer providing a set of front-end
and back-end para-virtualization drivers in order to alleviate
the complexity of emulating a device. Initially exclusively
intended for Linux para-virtualization, it was later extended to
bare-metal/RTOS within the OpenAMP project scope. VirtIO
uses a set of arrays and descriptors to implement a virtual
queue which encapsulates the control and shared data. Its ef-
ficiency results from its ring buffer structure which eliminates
the need for mutual exclusion primitives or unnecessary data
copies. The virtual queue conceptually binds the front-end and
back-end drivers.
Amongst the VirtIO supported devices is the RPMsg device.
The RPMsg device is not designed for para-virtualization;
however, it takes advantage of the underlying transport ab-
straction layer, the virtual queues, used as its communication
transport layer. The intended back-end and front-end drivers
are converted in master and slave communication drivers,
respectively. RPMsg communication was proposed under the
scope of heterogeneous inter-core communication.
RPMsg defines a point-to-point non-persistent asynchronous
communication. Each point-to-point communication is defined
as a RPMsg channel. Each channel may contain several
endpoints, with their own call backs, enabling several distinct
communication applications within the same channel. Each
RPMsg VirtIO device uses two sets of virtual queues, which
are converted into unidirectional transport channels with spe-
cific and individual interrupts. Each channel has defined two
sources of interrupts: one for message transmission notifica-
tion; and the other for buffer freed notification. In order to
enable unordered messages between different endpoints, the
non-persistent communication requires the use of a header in
each transaction.





































Fig. 2: TZ-VirtIO generic architecture
III. TZ-VIRTIO
Fig. 2 depicts the proposed TZ-VirtIO communication
mechanism implemention. TZ-VirtIO encompasses: 1) the
RPMsg and VirtIO driver modules, 2) optional user-space
communication tasks and 3) isolated data and event paths.
The latter promotes unblocking asynchronous communication,
essential for the timing requirements of the secure guest.
It features a shared memory block at kernel-level and an
event path routed through the hypervisor. An adaptation of
the inter-core RPMsg defined communication protocol to an
inter-partition supervised architecture was performed.
A. Data Path
The data path is defined by a shared block of memory
configured as non-secure. The shared memory block is config-
ured at compile-time and it is statically allocated at boot-time.
The hypervisor sets this block memory as non-secure through
the TZASC so both the non-secure and secure partitions can
access it. Both guests allocate the shared memory at kernel-
level. Linux, the GPOS used on the deployed system, assigns
the shared memory block to the VirtIO device through the
contiguous memory allocator (CMA) driver.
The RTOS should be designated as the communication
master, even though both modes are available in both guests’
communication mechanism. The communication master is
responsible for the management of the shared memory at boot-
time and consequently the initial organization of the VirtIO
buffers, a task which should, therefore, be handled by the
trusted privileged software, i.e. the RTOS.
B. Event Path
Existing TrustZone-assisted trusted execution environments
(TEE), such as IIoTEED [17] and Linaro’s OP-TEE2, rely on
the use of the SMC instruction to implement their event path.
Typically, this approach implements an RPC schema, which
requires a prompt world-switch and an immediate handling.
This method does not seem suitable under the LTZVisor scope,
because it would lead to considerable inter-guest interference,
2https://www.linaro.org/initiatives/op-tee/
lack of predictability and even jeopardization of the real-time
guarantees.
TZ-VirtIO explores the use of Inter-Processor Interrupts
(IPIs) to implement the inter-partition notifications of RPMsg.
These interrupts cannot be issued natively as the TrustZone
hardware blocks the non-secure world from interrupting the
secure world. Moreover, on the single-core configuration, a di-
rect trigger of the interrupt would cause a self-interrupt on the
same guest generating it. For these reasons the interrupts are
routed through the hypervisor. The event path routing imposes
a slight increase in the partition-switching time, however, it
also guarantees the reliability of the communication as the
hypervisor has control over every transaction.
The direct triggering of an IPI was replaced by an interrupt
request to the hypervisor via the SMC instruction, forcing
an immediate switch to the monitor mode. The hypervisor
then follows one of two approaches, depending of the system
configuration (single or multi-core): 1) stores the interrupt
request in a circular buffer and during the next context-switch
triggers a previously stored IPI to the respective guest OS
or 2) it immediately generates the IPI. The first approach is
valid for the single-core configuration while the second one
can only be used on the asymmetric multiprocessing schema.
Regardless of the configuration, the request interface remains
the same, providing an architecture configuration abstraction
at guest-level of the event path.
In the single-core configuration, the interrupt requests are
stored in a buffer, part of the targeted guest virtual ma-
chine context block (VMCB). The storing mechanism does
not require a prompt context-switch, protecting the real-time
requirements of the RTOS. The interrupt will only be triggered
during the next scheduled context-switch. A limit of one
interrupt per world-switch was imposed in order to lower the
communication interference in the partition-switching time.
From the two interrupts available per channel, the message no-
tification interrupt has the highest priority in the storage buffer.
The natively supported burst mode (one interrupt for several
messages) of RPMsg allows the aforementioned imposed limit
without bottlenecking the communication performance. The
storage mechanism chosen, a circular buffer which follows a
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first-in first-out policy, enables the scalability of the solution
in a multi-guest architecture.
C. RPMsg Adaptation
Russell’s VirtIO [10] and Texas RPMsg implementations
provide the foundation for TZ-VirtIO implementation on top
of the GPOS, while OpenAMP RPMsg and VirtIO implemen-
tation provides the foundation for the RTOS approach.
Amongst the modifications in the communication adaptation
is the Remoteproc module elimination, intrinsically connected
with RPMsg and VirtIO. Remoteproc contains the processor-
dependent software and is responsible for the processor cores
life cycle management and application binary load on its
native implementation. However, these last features violate
the virtualization isolation imposed by the hypervisor and
are already part of the LTZVisor framework. The VirtIO
configuration and memory allocation are now performed stat-
ically by the RPMsg module. Furthermore, the pair GPOS-
slave/RTOS-master modes were implemented using the same
RPMsg/VirtIO standards. On both configurations the RPMsg
blocking fetch of VirtIO buffers was removed.
D. Key Features
The key features of TZ-VirtIO can be summarized as:
• Memory fault proof – all of TZ-VirtIO resources are
allocated statically, including the shared memory region
and VirtIO’s shared memory control data, hindering any
access to unmapped or inexistent memory.
• Real-time – LTZVisor’s real-time requirements are un-
affected by TZ-VirtIO’s communication due to its asyn-
chronous multipath communication properties. The com-
munication tasks are assigned with the lowest priority
and VirtIO implements lock-free shared memory uni-
directional FIFOs and non-blocking fetch of buffers.
Furthermore, TZ-VirtIO contemplates, on both single-
and multi-core configuration, an interrupt request disabler
at hypervisor level, to be used by any of the receiving
guests, foreshadowing an RTOS possible need for critical
sections or a malicious use of the interrupt.
• Throughput – TZ-VirtIO efficiency relies on its VirtIO
transport layer. The use of shared memory reduces the
overhead induced by avoidable data copies. Moreover,
the RPMsg burst message capability combined with the
interrupt storing mechanism provide an efficient separated
event path without unnecessary context-switch overhead.
E. Limitations
Although announced as RPMsg/VirtIO communication pos-
sible capabilities, some features such as zero-copy and mes-
sage sampling, as well as the implementation of remote
procedure call (RPC) pattern on top of the RPMsg were not
implemented in TZ-VirtIO. The single interrupt triggering per
context-switch can be seen as a limitation on specific cases,
given that the ”buffer free” interrupt has lower priority than
the message notification interrupt inside the hypervisor storage
buffer, and could represent a bottleneck on buffer fetch event-
driven applications.
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IV. EVALUATION
The performance of the communication mechanism and
its impact on LTZVisor was evaluated in the Zedboard,
a TrustZone-enabled platform endowed with a dual ARM
Cortex-A9 running at 667MHz. The hardware architecture
enables the characterization of both the single-core and multi-
core capabilities of the TZ-VirtIO communication. Perfor-
mance results were gathered resorting to the Performance
Monitoring Unit (PMU) component present in the SoC. Mem-
ory footprint results were collected using the size tool of ARM
GNU Xilinx toolchain. Linux (version 4.0) and FreeRTOS
(7.0.2) run as non-secure and secure guest OS, respectively.
A. Overhead
TZ-VirtIO introduces two sources of overhead in the LTZVi-
sor system: memory overhead and context-switch time over-
head. The context-switch overhead is only present in the
single-core architecture and has two distinct parts: the handling
of the interrupt storage circular buffer by the hypervisor and,
in case of interrupt existence, its consequent triggering. Hence,
the context-switch overhead was monitored in three different
scenarios: with interrupts disabled (1.1 and 2.1 in Table II)
and with interrupts enabled; the latter either with the interrupt
buffer empty (1.2 and 2.2) or filled (1.3 and 2.3).
Table I displays the memory footprint in bytes for each
software component for both single-core and multi-core con-
figurations. The memory footprint refers exclusively to the
system’s TCB, i.e., the software running on the secure world
side: LTZVisor and RTOS. In accordance with Table I, TZ-
VirtIO represents an addition of 5,7% and 7,2% in the memory
footprint for the single-core and multi-core configurations,
respectively.
As for the context-switch performance, each test was re-
peated a hundred times, and the results report the mean (μ)
value and the respective standard deviation (σ) of the collected
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Fig. 3: TZ-VirtIO latency and throughput for different data size (single-core and multi-core)
measurements. The fluctuation in the measured values, in spite
of the constant number of instructions executed, is justified
by some dynamic architectural features of the Cortex-A9
processor, such as cache and branch prediction.
Table II presents the overhead introduced in the context-
switch performance. An addition of 28,36% and 16,97% to
the ”secure to non-secure” and ”non-secure to secure” context-
switch time, respectively, is caused solely by the storage
interrupt buffer handling (1.2 and 2.2). In case it requires an
interrupt triggering, scenarios 1.3 and 2.3, the impact on the
context-switch time is much higher, increasing the context-
switch time by 132% and 64,4%, respectively.
The values presented in Table II indicate that, as expected,
the inter-partition interrupt routing through the hypervisor has
a slightly negative impact on the global system performance
and latency. Although a mandatory characteristic in the single-
core architecture, this event routing also represents a trade-off
between performance and security. It guarantees the reliability
of the communication, providing a secure interface for the
inter-partition notification system.
B. Performance
To assess the performance of the implemented communi-
cation mechanism the experiments were conducted for a best
case scenario. The low priority assigned to the communication
tasks (i.e., for keeping LTZVisor real-time requirements near
intact) results in an amount of non-deterministic restraints
which make very difficult to experiment a worst-case eval-
uation (which ultimately could lead to the non-existence of
communication). Therefore, to setup the best case scenario no
real-time tasks were added to the system, which mean the
communication tasks had the highest priority of execution.
For this test case scenario the RTOS was configured as
master (communication is issued from the FreeRTOS to the
Linux) and its buffer payload maximum size was set to
512 bytes. Each value represents the throughput and latency
equivalent to the time measured between the issue of the
first message until the arrival of the last message for the
different payload sizes. Each sample reflects the average of
100 collected measurements.
Fig. 3 depicts the throughput and latency for different data
sizes. For a single message, i.e. size below 512 bytes, the
throughput is very similar for both single-core and multi-
core configurations. For a data size of 1 byte, the throughput
of the single-core configuration is 17% less than for the
multi-core configuration. The reason behind this penalty is
related to the extra context-switch time needed to handle
asynchronous notifications, which do not happen in a multi-
core configuration. This performance degradation decreases as
the data size increases, reaching 1% for a message with 512
bytes. When the data size is higher than 512 bytes, i.e. more
than one message is transmitted, the throughput for the single-
core communication keeps near 8Mbps. For the the inter-
partition communication in the multi-core configuration its
throughput reaches 14,5Mbps, which means an improvement
of 85% comparing with the single-core architecture. This
values demonstrate the performance enhancement provided by
the parallel processing of the multi-core configuration.
V. RELATED WORK
Several virtualization solutions implement inter-partition
communication mechanisms, either with the intent of provid-
ing guest-level device para-virtualization or merely to provide
a communication infrastructure among partitions. However,
the majority of existing solutions follows an ad hoc imple-
mentation with limited applicability outside their proposed
solution’s scope.
Xen [5] implements its own communication mechanism
with a transport system which was the inspiration for VirtIO.
Despite its widespread popularity, the use of this communi-
cation system outside of Xen scope is severely difficult as it
would require the support for Xen-Bus probing and configu-
ration system. The inter-domain communication mechanism
is mainly used for device para-virtualization. Contrarily to
typical approaches, Xen places the back-end drivers on the
most privileged guest (Dom0) which has full ownership over
the systems devices. The least privileged guests (Dom-U)
communicate with Dom0 through the front-end drivers.
SASP [6], a dual-OS TrustZone-based solution, implements
a secure device access similar to Xen’s: only one partition
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has full access to the system devices, requiring device para-
virtualization at guest level. The underlying communication
mechanism between guests follows a similar approach to TZ-
VirtIO on the event path level, featuring the use of IPIs.
However, SASP implements a synchronous communication
with shared memory at monitor level, which reveals a blocking
mechanism with unnecessary data copies, favoring reliability
at the expense of performance.
SafeG [7] implements a TrustZone-based dual-OS commu-
nication system. It features several unique mechanisms: shared
memory at user-space level, range-checking control data,
message filters, and interrupt limiters. The shared memory is
managed by untrusted-privileged applications exposing it to
potential malicious software attacks by untrusted-unprivileged
applications. The communication presents some similarities
with TZ-VirtIO such as availability of single event notification
for several messages and transmission messages divided into
two different paths (data and event); however, it follows a
non-standardized interface.
Jailhouse [8] is an open-source Linux-based hypervisor.
Shared device access and inter-domain communication is
enabled by the hypervisor through shared mapped-IO and
shared memory, respectively. Both kinds of communication
are unsupervised, compliant with its minimalistic design, an
unreliable approach which depends on the guests appropriate
behavior. The inter-partition communications implementation
is based on virtual peripheral component interconnect (PCI)
using Message Single Interrupts (MSI-X) or legacy interrupts;
optionally, a virtual ethernet link can be implemented on top
of it. In systems lacking PCI hardware, Jailhouse emulates a
simple generic PCI host controller.
KVM [11] and lguest [12], both Linux-hosted hypervisors,
make use of the standardized VirtIO drivers to implement
device para-virtualization. lguest was implemented as proof
of concept and with the aim to standardize open-source para-
virtualization techniques. KVM, a mature approach on Linux-
centric hypervisor, followed lguest in the use of VirtIO. The
communication mechanism in these hypervisors is, however,
limited to guest-host communication.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a standardized inter-partition commu-
nication for a TrustZone-assisted hypervisor. TZ-VirtIO pro-
vides an asynchronous non-persistent communication mecha-
nism independent of the core architecture of the hypervisor,
supporting both single and multi-core configurations. The
proposed approach is based on the VirtIO standard, and
makes use of its infrastructure for the communication transport
abstraction layer. Experiments demonstrated a negative impact
on the hypervisor context-switch execution time, on the single-
core configuration, mainly caused by the event path routing.
However, without the event path the communication would
become unsupervised and thus, unreliable. Assessed results
demonstrate the maximum throughput increases from 8 Mbps
to 14.5 Mbps when the system scales from a single- to a multi-
core configuration.
Work in the near future will focus on the evaluation on
a broader spectrum of scenarios and on the implementation
of additional communication features such as zero-copy and
message sampling. In the near feature, we also plan to merge
this communication subsystem to the open-source project’s
repository.
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